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Abstract. This paper investigates the specific experience of following a sugges-
tion by an intelligent machine that has a wrong outcome and the emotions people 
feel. By adopting a typical task employed in studies on decision-making, we pre-
sented participants with two scenarios in which they follow a suggestion and have 
a wrong outcome by either an expert human being or an intelligent machine. We 
found a significant decrease in the perceived responsibility on the wrong choice 
when the machine offers the suggestion. At present, few studies have investigated 
the negative emotions that could arise from a bad outcome after following the 
suggestion given by an intelligent system, and how to cope with the potential 
distrust that could affect the long-term use of the system and the cooperation. 
This preliminary research has implications in the study of cooperation and deci-
sion making with intelligent machines. Further research may address how to offer 
the suggestion in order to better cope with user’s self-blame. 
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1. Introduction 
Today intelligent systems are entering into our everyday life. These sys-
tems can help people to make more effective choices by generating pre-
dictions to the user in the form of advice and suggestions. Thus, in order 
to improve the design of these systems a greater understanding is needed 
on the conditions in which people emotionally deal with suggestions pro-
vided by an intelligent machine.  
In this paper, we present an initial study investigating the emotions felt 
by people after following a wrong suggestion provided by a supposedly 
intelligent machine. We have focused on four specific emotions related 
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to non-optimal decisions: regret, disappointment, guilt, and perceived 
responsibility.  
Our results provides evidence that users’ feelings of self-blame tend to 
be lower when they receive a wrong suggestion by a computer and the 
responses have a larger variation with respect to when the suggestion is 
provided by a human being.  
2. Theoretical framework 
Since the envision of Artificial Intelligence, technical progress has the 
intent of surpassing human performance and ability [1]. However, re-
cently there is a growing interest in understanding the conditions for an 
effective cooperative relationship between human and computer agents 
as well as the possible biases of this cooperation.  
In some recent studies, Logg [2, 3] has shown that people trust more a 
machine than other people when they need to make a decision in an ob-
jective context (e.g., they are looking for information). In other studies, 
in a subjective context (e.g., looking for book recommendations, looking 
for joke recommendations), people tend to rely more on other human 
beings [4, 5].  
Machines can exceed human judgment in different ways. First, by ex-
ploiting the “wisdom of crowds”, machines can surpass human accuracy 
in decisions even with simple algorithms (for example, averaging be-
tween the opinion of several individuals) [3, 6–8]. Second, algorithms 
trained with the same features used by human experts may exploit them 
more accurately [9]. Third, machine can automatically identify more pre-
dictive features than those commonly used by experts [10]. 
2.1 Emotions related with wrong decisions 
Regret and disappointment are “negative, cognitively determined emo-
tions that we may experience when a situation would have been better if: 
(a) we had done something different (in case of regret); or (b) the state 
of the world had been different (in case of disappointment)” [11]. They 
are the two most important emotions related with the decision process 
and both of them can be defined as counterfactual [12, 13]. Early theories 
have been studied by economists and investigated how the feeling of an-
ticipated regret affects the decision process under uncertainty (e.g., [14–
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16] ). In psychological literature, the focus often is on how negative out-
comes could intensify the experience of regret [17] and in how disap-
pointment influences decision making [16, 18]. 
More specifically, regret is experienced when one could not obtain the 
expected goals, while disappointment arises when there is a goal aban-
donment [12]. Zeelenberg and colleagues argument that regret is related 
to a behavioral switch and decreases trust, whereas disappointment in-
creases trust [19, 20]. Other studies argue that regret increases prosocial 
behaviors, while disappointment reduces them [19, 21, 22]. 
Another important aspect is how responsibility is related to these two 
emotions. Regret and disappointment differ from the perceived respon-
sibility of the outcome: when a person feels more responsible for the bad 
outcome, regret is involved; while disappointment is involved when the 
person feels to not be responsible for the outcome [23, 24]. 
Particular attention should be paid to the difference between regret and 
guilt, both originated by negative outcomes related to a sense of self-
responsibility. According to Zeelenberg and Breugelmans [25], regret 
and guilt are perceived as emotional outcomes of negative events and are 
related with a sense of self-agency and with the intention to change the 
event that happened. However, there are still not clear criteria to distin-
guish these two emotions while there is a general understanding that de-
fines regret as a broader emotion than guilt [25, 26]. For example, 
Berndsen and colleagues [27] distinguish guilt from regret on the basis 
of interpersonal and more social factors related to guilt and intrapersonal 
factors more related to regret. 
3. A user study on wrong decisions with intelligent 
machines 
This study aims at investigating the emotional effects of a wrong deci-
sion taken after a suggestion by an intelligent machine with respect to 
when the wrong decision is taken after the suggestion from a human be-
ing. Our hypothesis is that when a suggestion is received by an intelligent 
machine (at least in an objective decision task), a wrong outcome may 
elicit less emotion directed toward the self, compared to the situation in 
which the suggestion is given by a human being. That is because an in-
telligent machine might be expected to provide more accurate sugges-
tions [9] and the perceived agency is limited (unless the machine does 
have anthropomorphic features [28]).  
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Following a common practice in decision-making studies, we use sce-
narios rather than interactions with a real intelligent system in order to 
better control the conditions. 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Given the theoretical framework described above, and in particular fol-
lowing the results on decisions’ outcomes of Logg [2,3], we expected 
that a suggestion provided by an intelligent machine (in a technical and 
relatively complicated decision task) decreases the possibility for the 
user to blame the advisor and therefore should produce a lower rating on 
counterfactual emotions and responsibility.  
Therefore, after a wrong suggestion by an intelligent machine we pos-
tulate the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis on regret: the user feels less regret than after a wrong sug-
gestion given by a human being. 
• Hypothesis on disappointment: the user feels more disappointment 
than after a wrong suggestion given by a human being. 
• Hypothesis on responsibility:  the user feels less responsible for the 
choice and for the bad outcome than after a wrong suggestion given 
by a human being. 
• Hypothesis on guilt: the user experiences less guilt than after a wrong 
suggestion given by a human being. 
3.2 Participants 
Eighty-five participants were involved through the platform Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Their age ranges from 18 to 66 years old (57 males, 
24 females; mean=34 years; SD=9.55 years). The only requirement for 
participation was fluency in English.  
3.3 Measures 
In order to measure negative and counterfactual emotions, a question-
naire was built with 13 items obtained from validated scales: 
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• Responsibility (self-blame) is assessed by two items: the first measured 
the responsibility on the choice done, while the second one is about 
having done a bad purchase (i.e., bad outcome) [29]. 
• Regret is evaluated by two items aimed to assess the regret felt on the 
choice done and the regret felt for having a phone that does not meet 
the study participant’s needs [29]. 
• Disappointment is assessed by two items aimed to evaluate the disap-
pointment felt about having done a wrong choice and the disappoint-
ment for having a phone that does not meet the study participant’s 
needs [29]. 
• Perceived Guilt is assessed by two items aimed to assess the perceived 
guilt on the choice done and the perceived guilt for having a phone 
that does not fulfill the study participants’ needs [29]. 
The items are all 10-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (10). Although Giorgetta [29] used 11-point scales,    
we eventually decided to not to have a central point. 
Two items are added to control the experience of counterfactuals 
measuring the affective reaction and the dissatisfaction of the participant 
[30]. Finally, a manipulation check to prevent random answers is in-
cluded (the item simply asks to select the “totally agree” score [31]). 
3.4 Procedure  
The experimental design is a between-subject with two conditions: (i) 
when a human being provides the suggestion (condition “Human”) and 
(ii) when an intelligent machine provides the suggestion (condition 
“Computer”). 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participant received a short 
introduction to the task and s/he is asked to read and accept the informed 
consent and a short demographic questionnaire about age, gender and 
self-reported English fluency.  
After that, the participant is automatically assigned to one of the two 
conditions and asked to read the first scenario about a purchase decision. 
The first scenario in “Computer” condition is as follows: 
 
“Imagine that you have to buy a new smartphone because yours has 
just stopped working. Even if you are not an expert, you go to the 
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shop with the idea of buying XY10, because you think that is the 
model that best suits your preferences. Once in the shop, you enter 
your preferences in an algorithm‑based website that suggests you 
buy smartphone WLx at the same price. Hence you decide to buy the 
suggested model WLx. Some time later, you realize that model XY10 
would have been better for your needs, while the smartphone you 
have bought does not meet your expectations.” 
 
The scenario in “Human” condition describes the same situation but it is 
different on the source of the advice: 
 
“Imagine that you have to buy a new smartphone because yours has 
just stopped working. Even if you are not an expert, you go to the 
shop with the idea of buying XY10, because you think that is the 
model that best suits your preferences. Once in the shop, you explain 
your preferences to the clerk who suggests you buy smartphone 
WLx at the same price. Hence you decide to buy the suggested model 
WLx. Some time later, you realize that model XY10 would have been 
better for your needs, while the smartphone you have bought does 
not meet your expectations.” 
 
Immediately after that, the questionnaire on negative and counterfactual 
emotions was administered for the first time. After the questionnaire, the 
participant was exposed to a second situation. The second scenario was 
about the same choice as before after a year and asked to check how 
dissatisfaction emotions change for the same decisional framework. 
Then, the participant was presented with the questionnaire on emotions 
for the second time. 
At the end of the task, the participant was asked to recall the source of 
the suggestion received as a further attentional check. 
Finally, the last step was about the debriefing of the participants on the 
actual aims of the study. 
4. Analysis 
Before starting the analysis, the data has been checked for consistency. 
First, four participants were removed because they did not answer all the 
questions and another four participants were removed because they 
failed the consistency checks.  
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Then, 26 participants were removed because they showed inconsistent 
answers to the two control questions: “I am sorry about what happened 
to me” and “I am satisfied about what happened to me” in either the first 
or the second scenario.  
Finally, 13 participants were removed because they took too long to 
complete the task. In order to identify these outliers, we adopted the Tuk-
ey's fences technique and we removed all the participants that took a time 
longer than 1.5 times the third quartile (4 minutes).  
Eventually, 38 participants were retained for the study. The mean age 
was 32.5 years old (SD=7.39) ranging from 18 to 60 years old. Fifteen 
were women and 36 men. The average of the male sample has the mean 
equal to 31.44 years old (SD=6.57), and the female sample has mean 
35.06 years old (SD=8.78). 
 
 
Fig. 1. The distribution of the negative and counter-factual emotions for the first scenario 
The distributions of the emotions in the two conditions and in the two 
scenarios are shown in Figure 1 for the first scenario and in Figure 2, 
respectively.  
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Fig. 2. The distribution of the negative and counterfactual emotions for the second scenario 
For disappointment, regret and guilt there was no statistical difference in 
the two conditions in either scenarios. However, the responsibility on 
choice seems to change whether the source of suggestion was human or 
machine (using Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, p = 0.09088 for the first 
scenario and p=0.04318 for the second scenario). The participants 
showed more self-blame when the suggestion came from a human being 
(mean=6.6 vs 8.4, sd=3.2 vs 1.6 in the first scenario and mean=6.4 vs 
8.1, sd=3.6 vs 1.7 in the second scenario). Furthermore, the variance was 
much higher in the computer condition with respect to the human condi-
tion in both scenarios (Fligner-Killeen test of homogeneity of variances, 
p= 0.04051 and p= 0.00632, respectively). 
5. Discussion 
The results were not what we expected since we did not find any differ-
ence in regret, disappointment and guilt. Yet, our intuition was at least 
partially confirmed because the effect on responsibility was rather 
strong. Indeed, the effect on responsibility can be related to the anteced-
ents of regret [32]. 
Even if further studies need to be carried out, from a Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) point of view, the decrease of the sense of responsibil-
ity when the suggestion comes from the computer may induce risky 
choices and it should be counterbalanced by appropriate design solu-
tions.  
The increase of variance in the responses when the suggestion comes 
from the computer may suggest that there might some cofounding vari-
able that mediate this effect. This aspect should be better explored in 
further studies. 
9 
The study had some limitations. First, we may note that for all emo-
tions and in both scenarios, the values tend to be quite high. This might 
be due to either a bias from recruiting the participants in a crowdsourcing 
service (as it might be apparent from the high number of participants that 
we had to exclude from the analysis) or from the scenarios that may have 
appeared confused or unnatural. Second, the variance is quite large for 
all the emotions and in both scenarios. Again, this might be due to the 
reasons above or it might depend by some conditions that we did not test 
(for example, different perceptions of the true intentions of the clerk 
while the computer might have look more neutral with respect to hidden 
intentions). Alternatively, personality traits (for example, the Locus of 
Control [33] of participants) might be a confounding variable in this 
case. Another possibility would be that participants might have trans-
ferred the responsibility of the wrong decision outcome on the source of 
the suggestion both perceived as experts (see for example the discussion 
in [24]).  
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we presented a preliminary research aimed at understand-
ing the possible differences in the acceptance of a suggestion from an 
intelligent machine with respect to a human being. We adopted the spe-
cific lens of analyzing negative and counterfactual emotions when the 
choice is eventually wrong.  
Our study, in which we manipulated the outcome for controlling the 
experimental condition, found that participants’ feeling of self-blame is 
lower when they receive a wrong suggestion by a computer rather than 
by a human being. This may suggest that decision making with computer 
advice may eventually induce risky choices.   
This result needs to be confirmed by other studies, in particular in view 
of the lack of significance for the other negative and counterfactual emo-
tions that are well-known related with sense of responsibility. In partic-
ular, it will be important to vary the scenarios and to control for possible 
cofounding variables (such as personality traits or attitude toward tech-
nology). 
Still, we believe that our results are interesting for a better understand-
ing of the relation between users and intelligent machines in a decision-
making process and for a better design of this type of systems. 
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